Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna Tracy King v.
University of Utah Hospital, Does I Through X Ada
Hannah Tracy, Deceased, By and Through Sharon
Tracy Voight, Natural Daughter and Next Friend,
and Sharon Tracy Voigt : Brief of Respondent
University of Utah Hospital
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU; Attorney for Defendents-Respondent;SHARON
TRACY VOIGT; Pro se; D. KENDALL PERKINS; Attorney for Plaintiffs;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Tracy & King v. University Hospital, No. 16784 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1998

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA LEA TRACY and
DONNA TRACY KING,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
HOSPITAL, DOES I
through X,
Defendants-Respondent

Case No. 16784

ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased,
by and through Sharon Tracy
Voight, natural daughter and
next friend, and SHARON
TRACY VOIGT,
Applicants for
Intervention-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County, Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge

SHARON TRACY VOIGT
P. O. Box 874
Cathedral City, CA 92234
Applicant for InterventionAppel lant,
pro se
D. KENDALL PERKINS
12 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Merlin R. Lybbert
Kim R. Wilson
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondent

MAR28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA LEA TRACY and
DONNA TRACY KING,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
HOSPITAL, DOES I
through X,
Defendants-Respondent

Case No. 16784

ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased,
by and through Sharon Tracy
Voight, natural daughter and
next friend, and SHARON
TRACY VOIGT,
Applicants for
Intervention-Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County, Honorable Horner F. Wilkinson, Judge

SHARON TRACY VOIGT
P. O. Box 874
Cathedral City, CA 92234
Applicant for InterventionAppel lant,
pro se

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Merlin R. Lybbert
Kim R. Wilson
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondent

D. KENDALL PERKINS
12 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE. . . . • • • . . . • . . . • . . . . . • . • . • .
1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.........................

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . .

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . .

2

ARGUMENT. • • • • • . • . . . • • . • . . . • . • • . • . . • . • . . . • • • • • • • • . • •

4

POINT I:
JUDGE WINDER'S ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S SECOND MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS
TAKEN AND WHICH BARS APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
INTERVENE.
POINT II:
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO CONSIDER AND DETERMINE THE MERITS OF
APPELLANT'S SECOND MOTION TO INTERVENE WHILE
THE ORDER ON APPELLANT'S FIRST MOTION TO
INTERVENE WAS ON APPEAL BEFORE THIS COURT.
POINT III:
APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERY OF HER SHARE OF SUCH DAMAGES AS
MAY ULTIMATELY BE AWARDED.
SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED
Page
Commercial Block Realty Company v.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
2 8 p • 2 d 1 Q81 t 8 3 ut ah 4 14 ( 1 9 3 4 ) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

5

Drury v. Lunceford,
415 P.2d 662, 14 Utah 2974

9

(1966) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co.,
228 P. 557, 64 Utah 125 (1924) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Tripp v. District Court of Third
Judicial District,
56 P.2d 1355, 89 Utah 8 (1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

Veazey v. City of Durham,
57 S.E.2d 377 (N.C. 1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7, 8

AUTHORITIES CITED
12 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error,
Section 357 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · .. · · · · · · · · · ·

6

RULES CITED
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 41 (b) . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Rule 7 2 (a) • . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

5
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA LEA TRACY and
DONNA TRACY KING,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
HOSPITAL, DOES I
through X,

Case No. 16784

Defendants-respondent
ADA HANNAH TRACY, Deceased,
by and through Sharon Tracy

Voight, natural daughter and
next friend, and SHARON
TRACY VOIGHT,
Applicants for
Intervention-appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a suit by plaintiffs, Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna
Tracy King to recover for the wrongful death of their mother
arising out of her treatment at the University of Utah Hospital.
Applicants for Intervention and Appellant are the decedent and
a third daughter, Sharon Tracy Voigt.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant's third motion to intervene was heard on
November 16, 1979 by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District
Judge.

The motion was denied on the ground that a prior motion

to intervene had been granted with prejudice and that the
granting of the third motion was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the order denying Appellant•s
motion to intervene.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the statement of facts in Appellant's brief is
incomplete, Respondent will here set forth facts it believes
are material to this appeal.
On or about May 15, 1975, Ada Hannah Tracy died while a
patient at the University of Utah Hospital.

She was survived

by three daughters including Lynda Lea Tracy, Donna Tracy King
and Appellant.
On or about January 20, 1977, Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna
Tracy King instituted an action against the University of Utah
Hospital in the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking
damages for the wrongful death of Ada Hannah Tracy.
On or about November 10, 1977, Sharon Tracy, sometimes
known in these proceedings as Sharon Tracy Voigt, appearing
pro se, filed a motion on behalf of herself and Ada Hannah
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Tracy, her deceased mother, to intervene in the pending action
initially brought by her sisters.
The motion to intervene was argued before the Honorable
David K. Winder, District Judge, on February 14, 1978.

At the

conclusion of the hearing Judge Winder denied the motion to
intervene without prejudice (R. 64).
Appellant took an appeal to this Court from Judge Winder's
order (R. 64).

On or about May 25, 1978, Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the denial of a
motion to intervene without prejudice was not a final order
within the meaning of Rule 72 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Court agreed and on June 7, 1978, granted the motion to
dismiss the appeal (R. 177-178).
During the time this Court was considerir.

the appeal from

Judge Winder's order denying intervention, Appellant filed a
second motion to intervene along with other motions (R. 122-123).
A hearing was held thereon on April 10, 1978, before Judge
Winder.

At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Winder entered

his order dated April 12, 1978, denying Appellant's second
motion to intervene (R. 130-131).
Appellant attempted to file a notice of appeal from the
April 12, 1978 order but failed and refused to pay the filing
fees required by law after notice that the appeal would not be
accepted without the fees.

A copy of Judge Winder's letter to

Appellant on May 3, 1978, relating to the filing of the appeal

3
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is at R. 153-154.

The notice of appeal was never filed from

Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978, denying the second
motion to intervene.
On or about March 1, 1979, Appellant filed her third
motion to intervene in the pending action (R. 339-340).

A

hearing was held thereon on November 16, 1979, before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge.
entered his order on November 30, 1979,

Judge Wilkinson

(R. 408-409) denying

Appellant's third motion to intervene on the ground that Judge
Winder's order of April 12, 1978,

(R. 130-131) denied the same

motion with prejudice and was a valid, binding order which
barred the granting of the third motion to intervene under the
doctrine of res judicata.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
JUDGE WINDER'S ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S SECOND
MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER
FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS TAKEN AND WHICH BARS
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE.
Rules 72

(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides

in material part as follows:
An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from

all final orders and judgments, in accordance
with these rules: provided, that when other claims
remain to be determined in the proceedings, a party
may preserve his right to appeal on the decided
issue until a final determination of the other
claims by filing with the trial court and serving
on the adverse parties within the time permitted
in Rule 73 (a), a notice of his intention to do so.
4
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The above rule provides that either a notice of appeal
or a notice of intent to appeal must be filed within one month
from the entry of an appealable order.
Orders which finally adjudicate a person's status in a
suit or controversy are by definition final orders from which
appeal can be taken.

Judge Winder's second order finally

adjudicated Appellant's right to intervene in the suit in
that it was not granted "without prejudice".
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Rule 41 (b),

In Utah the denial of a

motion to intervene with prejudice is an appealable order.
In Conunercial Block Realty Company v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. 28 P.2d 1081, 83 Utah 414

(1934),

this Court said:
We believe that the better reasoned decisions are
to the effect that where it is a proper case for
intervention a judgment denying the right to intervene is appealable. At 1082.
This Court again affirmed that an order refusing to permit
intervention is appealable in Tripp v. District Court of Third
Judicial District, 56 P.2d 1355, 89 Utah 8 (1936).
Since Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978, denying
Appellant the right to intervene was an appealable order, an
appeal or notice of intent to appeal was required to have been
filed within one month of the entry of the order.

Appellant

failed to do so even in the face of precise instructions from

5
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the Court, and the order must now stand as the final adjudication, on the merits, on her rights to intervene in the
pending litigation.
Judge Winder's order of April 12, 1978,

is~

judicata

and bars the granting of a subsequent motion to intervene
made on behalf of the same parties and for the same reasons.
Therefore, Judge Wilkinson's order of November 30, 1979,
denying Appellant's third motion to intervene was proper and
made without error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER AND
DETERMINE THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S SECOND MOTION
TO INTERVENE WHILE THE ORDER ON APPELLANT'S FIRST
MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS ON APPEAL BEFORE THIS
COURT
Appellant contends that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to hear and consider her second motion to intervene
during the time the denial of her first motion to intervene
was on appeal to this Court.
It is the general rule that an appeal of a final order,
when duly perfected, divests the trial court of jurisdiction
of the cause and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court.
However, this rule does not apply in the case of a nonappealable
interlocutory order.
12 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error §357 states:
A litigant cannot deprive the trial court of jurisdiction by taking an appeal from a nonappealable
interlocutory order, and even an appeal from an
appealable intermediate or interlocutory order does
not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed in matters not involved in the appeal.
6
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In Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 SE 2d 377 (N.C. 1950), the
defendant asked the trial court to order a compulsory reference of the case.

When the trial court declined to enter such

an order, the defendant appealed to the North Carolina Supreme
Court.

The trial court retained jurisdiction over the cause

and tried the matter on its merits during the time its prior
order was on appeal to the Supreme Court.

At some time follow-

ing trial on the merits, the Supreme Court considered and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order was not an appealable order and was thus not subject to review.
The defendant appealed a second time contending that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to undertake further proceedings on the cause while the Judge's first order was on appeal.
In its opinion the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
issue that is now before this Court on this appeal.
[W]e are presently concerned with this precise
question: What is the effect of an appeal from
a nonappealable interlocutory order upon proceedings in the Superior Court pending the dismissal of an appeal by the Supreme Court? . . .
" • . . [A] litigant cannot deprive the Supreme
Court of jurisdiction to try and determine a
case on its merits by taking an appeal to the
Supreme Court from a nonappealable interlocutory
order of the Superior Court. A contrary decision would necessarily require an acceptance of
the paradoxical paralogism ~h~t a p~rty to.an .
action can paralyze the admini~tration of.Justice
in the Superior Court by the simple ex~edient
of doing what the law does not allow h~m t~ do,
i.e. taking an appeal from an order which is not
appealable.

7
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Our conclusion on this aspect of the controversy finds full sanction in previous decisions
of this Court adjudging that when an appeal is
taken to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court which is not
subject to appeal, the Superior Court need not
stay proceedings, but may disregard the appeal
and proceed to try the action while the appeal
on the interlocutory matter is in Supreme Court.
(Citing cases)
Moreover, this conclusion is
sustained by the repeated cases holding by
implication rather than by express declaration that an appeal to the Supreme Court
from a nonappealable order of the Superior
Court confers no power on the Supreme Court
to decide the appeal and that the Supreme Court
must dismiss the appeal because it cannot properly exercise a jurisdiction which it does not
possess.
57 SE 2d 377 at 382, 383.
The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that it had
no jurisdiction to hear the nonappealable order.

Therefore,

the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction in the
matter.

Thus, the orders and judgments of the trial court

during the pending appeal of the nonappealable order were
rendered within the full jurisdiction of the court and were
binding on the parties.
Here Appellant appealed Judge Winder's first order denying
her right to intervene without prejudice.

The order was found

by this Court to be nonappealable, and the appeal was summarily
dismissed.

Under the teachings of Veazey v. City of Durham

the trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter for all
purposes.
While the first nonappealable order was pending in this

8
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Court, Appellant sought to take advantage of the continuing
jurisdiction of the trial court and filed various other motions
including a second motion seeking to intervene in the pending
action.

The trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction,

and considered and ruled upon the motion.
order of April 12, 1978,

Judge Winder's

(R. 130-131) denied Appellant's

motion to intervene with prejudice.

No appeal was taken from

it and it, therefore, became final.
Appellant has raised the issue that her second motion to
intervene was but a motion to reconsider.

It should be noted

that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for
such a motion.
(1966).

Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P2d 662, 14 Utah 2974

There can be no mistake that Appellant's second motion

was a separately filed motion and that it sought leave for
Appellant to intervene in the pending suit.

Thus, Appellant's

contention is without merit and has no effect on the validity
of Judge Winder's order denying the motion.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERY OF HER
SHARE OF SUCH DAMAGES AS MAY ULTIMATELY BE
AWARDED.
Judge Wilkinson's order of November 30, 1979, contains
a provision which preserves to Appellant her rightful share
of any recovery for wrongful death which may be made in the
pending litigation.

That portion of the order reads as follows:

Lynda Lea Tracy and Donna Tracy King a~e entitled
to prosecute this action for the benefit of all
heirs of Ada Hannah Tracy, deceased, and the pro-.
ceeds of any settlement or judgment rendered herein
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shall be held by the present Plaintiffs for the
use and benefit of said heirs, including Tracy
Voigt, in accordance with their lawful claim upon
said proceeds.
Judge Wilkinson's otder is wholly consistent with Utah
law.

In Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557,

64 Utah 125 (1924), the Supreme Court held that there was

.

only one cause of actionf. for wrongful death in the State of
.

4

Utah and that if an action for wrongful death is prosecuted
by less than all of the heirs of the decedent, they prosecute it for the benefit of all heirs.

This Court said:

Nor is the omitted heir, if there be one, without
a remedy.
If damages are recovered, each heir is
entitled to his proportionate share, whether he
was a party to the action or not, and, if his
share is withheld from him, he may always sustain
an action against his co-heirs for contribution.
At 562.
Therefore, Appellant will not be prejudiced by denial
of her motion to intervene.
SUMMARY
Judge Wilkinson did not err in denying Appellant's third
motion to intervene.

The issue had been finally adjudicated

in a prior hearing before Judge Winder who had jurisdiction
to hear and to enter the dismissal order from which no appeal
was taken.

Judge Wilkinson properly denied the third motion

to intervene under the doctrine of res judicata.
Further, Judge Wilkinson's order preserves the right of
recovery of Appellant, and she, therefore, is not prejudiced

10
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by the ruling of the Court.
The Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2<:./

day of March, 1980.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By : -i....:""~-------------,,.~-
p Merlin R. Lybbert
Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Sandra Sparley, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendants-Respondent
herein; that she served the attached Brief of Respondent
(Case No. 16784) upon the parties listed below by placing two
true and correct copies thereof in an envelope addressed ·to:
Sharon Tracy Voigt
P. o. Box 874
Cathedral City, CA 92234
Applicant for InterventionAppellant
pro se
D. Kendall Perkins
12 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for plaintiffs
and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the

- - -day

of

March, 1980.
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of

March, 1980.
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